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1. Introduction 
"A congestion tax to discourage motorists from driving at peak times could be 
introduced under a controversial plan flagged by the federal government's chief 
infrastructure adviser. Infrastructure Australia chairman Sir Rod Eddington said it 
was time for ''mature and dispassionate'' discussion over a new system of road 
charges to cut congestion and help pay for major transport projects." (The Age, 8 
September 2012) 
Road pricing reform is much touted by economists and others who see the current charging 
instruments inadequate in both delivering efficient outcomes for road use (especially in controlling 
levels of traffic congestion) as well as raising sufficient revenue to fund new infrastructure and much 
needed maintenance of existing road networks (see Verhoef et al. 2008 and Manville and King 2012). 
The greatest challenge in reforming road user charges is how to devise a scheme which gains public 
acceptance, which means convincing voters that there are benefits to them, is also convincing to 
politicians who will be concerned about their electoral future (see Hensher and Bliemer 2012, Bliemer 
et al. 2009, Hensher et al. 2012) and satisfies Treasury. The public sentiment, albeit often 
misinformed, is well illustrated by the following summary of a recent radio conversation. 
 
Setting: ABC Radio 702 Tuesday 4 Oct 2011 8.30-8.55am. 
Hensher discusses the merits of Road Pricing Reform (after stating clearly that it is 
more than a congestion tax, and to please stop using the emotive language of a 
congestion TAX). Calls are invited from the public. 
A plumber calls and says (paraphrase): “…I spend up to 5 hours on the roads every 
day between jobs and now you are telling me I have to pay a congestion tax on top of 
all of my existing costs for the 5 hours. What is he thinking (the Professor needs to 
get real)… I do not earn enough income now as it is.” 
Hensher’s response (paraphrased): “…I made it very clear I thought that the aim is 
to reform the entire set of charges (including registration fees) and to set the 
kilometre based charges to reflect the traffic conditions with the aim of not only 
enabling you to save time (which is money as well) but to give you realistic options 
on levels of charge and time of day to travel. It is expected that you will spend less 
time travelling and can convert such saved time into more productive income 
earning time.” 
This paper promotes the belief that road pricing reform will be achieved only by a slow but 
progressive set of steps that must start some initiative that has an easier staged sell in respect of the 
“hip pocket” rather than with the explicit end objective to reduce traffic congestion. The predominant 
interest of car drivers when first asked about congestion charges is what it will mean financially to 
them (with rare reference to its value in improving travel times). This gives us the crucial clue on 
where to start in selling road pricing reform. 
The paper is organised as follows. We begin with a discussion of how registration fees can be 
packaged with peak1
                                                          
1 We also investigated all day distance-based charging, and while there may be some merits for this, including the view that the 
perception of an all day charge might look better as it is less (3) cents per km, on balance we believe that it will be more difficult to sell this 
as the first step, and so we have focussed on peak period only distance-based charging.  
 distance-based charges to obtain financial gains to key stakeholders. This is 
followed by an explanation of the method we have adopted, together with the Sydney Household 
Travel Survey data (expanded to the population), to undertake scenario analysis in determining the 
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financial and usage implications of varying registration fees and distance-based charges in the peak. 
We then present compelling evidence to show how road pricing reform can make both drivers and 
government better off financially. The conclusions summarise the main policy implications and topics 
requiring further research. 
2. Registration-usage pricing reform 
Whether any proposed reform begins with a driver-wide compulsory application or a voluntary opt in 
and opt out plan is secondary to establishing if there is financial merit in a scheme in terms of its 
impact on drivers. In addition to motorists, government, and especially Treasuries also have a keen 
concern for the revenue implications of road pricing reform.  The approach we propose in this paper is 
to start with a budgetary constraint that represents the need for Treasury to be financially no worse off 
(and possibly better off) while establishing a charging regime that will also make drivers, on average, 
financially no worse off (and possibly better off). 
The reform framework we adopt, as proposed in Hensher and Bliemer (2012),  that has these desired 
attributes involves the introduction of a distance-based charging regime in return for a discount on the 
current annual registration fee, in full or in part. Although governments often raise the prospect of 
increasing the annual registration fee to raise revenue (a recent example being the release in 
September 2012 of the NSW Long Term Transport Master Plan draft (TfNSW 2012)), we would 
argue that discounting of the registration fee can be used as part of a carrot and stick initiative to move 
to use-related charging to relieve a cost burden on motorists, at least in the initial phase of securing 
buy in to road pricing reform. To be able to say that a reform strategy will not make drivers worse off 
financially2 will be a major step forward in dulling the immediate critical response from motoring 
organisations and politicians! A resulting bonus of this reform plan, which is not available under a 
registration fee only regime, given the disconnection with kilometres travelled, is drivers enjoy the 
resulting travel time savings. The reduction in kilometres travelled, especially during peak periods, 
need not be radical in order to make enough of a difference in traffic congestion. The best evidence of 
this is the difference between peak period travel times on roads during school holidays and during 
normal times of the year, typically associated with up to 5 percent less traffic (or 1 in 20 vehicles) as a 
conservative estimate3
3. Sourcing data to quantify the potential cost and revenue 
impacts of the reform plan 
. 
The primary data on car driver trip activity and cost outlays is sourced from the Sydney Household 
Travel Survey (HTS), the largest and most comprehensive source of personal travel data for the 
                                                          
2 The issue of vertical equity is discussed in detail in Mulley and Hensher (2012), since some individuals may be (slightly) worse off 
financially even though most will be better off. Some form of a compensation package may have merit in such circumstances, with monies 
coming from the additional revenue gain beyond the revenue neutral outcome for Treasury. 
3 Based on data from the Sydney annual Household Travel Survey and 
 http://www.rta.nsw.gov.au/publicationsstatisticsforms/downloads/travelspeeds_sydney_metro_area.html 
During school holidays, traffic lightens by about 7 to 10 percent outside school drop off hours, yet the influence that this has 
on traffic flow is immense. (See http://www.privatefleet.com.au/congestion/). The National Road and Motorists Association 
(NRMA) of Australia uses a rule of thumb that when traffic on congested roads falls by 5 per cent, speeds increase about 50 
per cent (though this might only mean an average speed increase from 20 km/h to 30 km/h).See 
http://smh.drive.com.au/roads-and-traffic/how-do-you-spell-the-end-of-the-school-holidays-gridlock-20120715-224ag.html. 
We calculated a 4.77 percent drop in traffic volumes during school holidays in Sydney in 2005 on all the major arterial roads, 
freeways and tollroads (sourced from 
 http://www.rta.nsw.gov.au/trafficinformation/downloads/aadtdata_dl1.html.) 
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Sydney Greater Metropolitan Area. The HTS was first conducted in 1997/98 and has been running 
continuously since then. About 5,000 randomly selected households are approached each year to 
participate in the survey4
We have used pooled data of residents of occupied private dwellings in the Sydney Metropolitan Area 
from five waves, June 2007 to October 2011, weighted to June 30 2010 population. Population 
weights are based on the estimated resident population as at 30 June 2010. The data is based on an 
average day and is scaled up to the full year. We have undertaken all of the analysis at the 
geographical level of the Sydney Statistical Division (SSD)
. The sample of the continuous HTS is designed on a three-yearly cycle so 
that the pooling of three years of data gives a sample size similar to that achieved in the traditional 
once in 10 years metropolitan household interview survey. 
5. There are 14 SSD’s in Sydney; however 
we excluded the Statistical Division of Gosford Wyong which is unlikely to be exposed directly to 
road pricing reform6
In designing a scenario-based application framework, we need to identify the ‘before’ or status quo 
financial outlays and kilometres travelled by drivers in the peak and off-peak periods. Some costs are 
use-related such as fuel costs (distinguishing the fuel excise from the other fuel costs passed to 
motorists), and tolls, while the registration fees are annual fixed charges unrelated to usage. We also 
need to calculate the revenue obtained by State Treasury under the status quo situation. In this study 
we are interested in the revenue implications for the State (of NSW) Treasury who collect registration 
fees only, and who will under a distance-based charging regime also collect the use-related revenue. 
Fuel excise is collected by the Federal government and is disbursed as they see fit, with some of the 
funds returning to the States in many forms. Tolls are collected by the tollroad operators and are 
retained as part of the public-private partnership concession arrangements and are not available to 
State Treasuries. The tollroad network in Sydney is extensive by the standards of most cities (see Li 
and Hensher 2010). 
 (see Figure 1). 
                                                          
4 The HTS consists of a face-to-face interview survey carried out every day from July to June of each financial year. This collection 
method ensures high data quality and maximises response rates. A simple travel diary is used by each householder to record the details 
of all travel undertaken for their nominated 24-hour period. An interviewer then interviews each householder to collect the details of each 
trip. The interviewer records the mode of travel, trip purpose, start and end location, and time of departure and arrival. Vehicle occupancy, 
toll roads used and parking are recorded for private vehicle trips and fare type and cost for public transport trips. The HTS sampling 
method was designed for BTS by the Statistical Consultancy section of the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) such that the relative 
standard error (RSE) decreases and the statistical reliability increases as more waves of data are pooled. 
5 We have data at the postcode level which is at a greater level of spatial disaggregation; and while it is useful for studying sources of 
systematic variation that influence total kilometres travelled per driver, there are sample reliability concerns for the analysis undertaken 
herein. We use SSDs but undertake some additional scenario analysis to assess the range of annual kilometres of drivers from each SSD. 
6 There may be implications for residents of Gosford-Wyong who commute to the other Sydney SSDs; however this can, in future 
analysis, be included if required. 
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Figure 1:  The location of the 14 SSD’s in Sydney 
 
To determine the behavioural response of car drivers, expressed in terms of changes in peak and off 
peak kilometres, to the introduction of peak period distance-based charges (DBC), we need to assume 
a DBC elasticity of kilometres travelled, ceteris paribus. Li and Hensher (2012) provides one review 
of the evidence, although they find that the focus of most road pricing studies that have reported 
elasticity estimates has not been in terms of changes in kilometres travelled. Hensher et al. (1992), in 
a longitudinal study of household demand for automobile by type and kilometres travelled in Sydney, 
obtained static and dynamic short run and long price elasticities for fuel and registration charges in the 
context of annual kilometres travelled. We have drawn on this study to select price arc elasticities of -
0.25 and -0.35 respectively for peak and off-peak kilometres, which we suggest are generally in line 
with expert opinion. Sensitivity testing around these mean estimates enables us to determine the 
influence these estimates have on the change in kilometres travelled. These elasticities are applied to 
the fuel and toll costs7
 
 together with a peak period distance-based charge, assuming no change in total 
status quo kilometres. Formulae were developed to calculate the peak and off peak kilometres under a 
peak only DBC: 
                                                          
7 In Sydney, all tolled roads and cashless with electronic tags (ETAGS). ETAGS tend to make payment seamless and change the 
perception of toll payments since the driver is not having to be reminded in the same way as having to find cash and stop. This tends to 
reduce the price sensitivity and brings it closer to the fuel cost response. 
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Peak KmsAfter Elasticity Application  
= PKMBefore *{[1-((TCA|TotalKMBefore-RegnAfter)-(TCSQ-RegnSQ)/ (TCSQ-RegnSQ))]*Abs Elas}Off Peak KmsAfter 
Elasticity Application = Total KMBefore*(1-Proportion PKM), 
 
where PKM = annual peak kilometres, Regn = annual registration fee, TCSQ= total costs before (i.e., status quo) 
reforms, TotalKMBefore =  total annual kilometres after DBC but holding kilometres to SQ levels, and Abs Elas = 
the direct elasticity without sign. 
Table 1 summarises the kilometre activity of motorists resident in each SSD together with the mean 
personal income as background to the setting where the extent of changes in annual kilometres in the 
peak and off peak periods change in the presence of reforms to the cost of owning and user cars is to 
be identified. As might be expected, the quantum of kilometres of residents of each SSD varies 
significantly and in large measure is due to location relative to the Sydney Central Business District, 
reflecting the radial-centric nature of Sydney. The data has an implied direct elasticity of daily 
kilometres per driver with respect to distance from the CBD of 0.21 (obtained from a linear regression 
model in which distance to the CBD was statistically significant with a t-value of 3.64 and in which 
the overall explanation of variation (adjusted R2
When we use equivalent data at the postcode level, the overall fit of the model is poor, (adjusted R
) is 51 percent); hence a 10 percent increase in the 
average distance to the CBD increases average daily kilometres per driver by 2.10 percent, ceteris 
paribus. Interestingly, when we add in personal income, retaining distance to the CBD, we find that 
the parameter associated with the natural logarithm of income is not statistically significant (t-value of 
1.29) but with an implied mean direct elasticity of daily kilometres per driver with respect to mean 
personal income per SSD that is very close to unity (1.03). If distance to the CBD is removed from the 
model, the personal income parameter is negative (-0.85) and highly non-significant (t-value of -0.95). 
At the mean, therefore, there appears to be no statistically significant relationship between average 
daily kilometres per driver and income. 
2 
Mulley and Hensher (2012) investigate in detail the vertical equity implications of the pricing reform 
evidence in this paper.  In this paper we now take a closer look at the combinations of a distance-
based charge and discounted registration fees that satisfy the budget neutral (or better) requirement of 
State Treasury, and which also deliver no financial impost on drivers overall. 
of 
0.027), although both distance from the CBD and personal income as the only variables in the model, 
are statistically significant with respective t-values of 12.76 and 11.79. The implied direct elasticity of 
daily kilometres per driver with respect to distance from the CBD is 0.27, not dissimilar to the SSD 
level evidence of 0.21, and with respect to personal income it is 0.15. 
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Table 1:  Descriptive profile of SSD level data 
 
 
4. Identifying the preferred mix of a peak period distance-
based charge and discounted annual registration fee 
To establish the financial implications of alternative combinations of a peak period DBC and 
discounted annual registration fees, we built a scenario decision support system (in excel). The key 
inputs, for each SSD and status quo (i.e., before) situation, are the mean annual kilometres, the 
proportion of kilometres in the peak periods (AM and PM)8, the average daily cost per driver 
(comprising fuel and tolls, distinguished by peak and off peak periods), annual registration fees, and 
mean direct elasticities of peak and off peak kilometres with respect to usage costs. In addition, for the 
reform scenarios, we considered a DBC varying from 2c/km to 10c/km in the peak, and allowed 
annual registration fees to vary from 30 to 75 percent of the status quo annual fee. These ranges were 
determined from an initial assessment of likely adjustments that would satisfy the binding constraints 
to be neutral to government revenue and driver cost outlays. As part of scenario definition, given the 
absence of any evidence on cross elasticities of kilometre switching by time of day under a move from 
a fixed annual registration fee to a DBC use-related charge, we have assumed that all kilometres that 
have moved from the peak period do not move to the off-peak9
 
. This is a limiting assumption, with an 
expectation that we have under-predicted the change in off-peak kilometres (Bliemer et al. 2009). 
Since the off-peak kilometres do not have a DBC cost element, the impact on State Treasury is zero; 
although there is a reduction in Federal fuel excise. 
                                                          
8 The peak is defined as 6.31am to 9.30 am and 3.01pm to 6pm Monday to Friday. 
9 When we introduced an all day DBC, we would also get a change in off-peak kilometres but that scenario is not considered in this paper. 
SSD Mean Personal Income ($'000s) StdDev Income Mean Kms per day per driver StDev KmDay perDrv
Inner Sydney 62.89 41.07 13.97 21.45
Eastern Suburbs 63.38 43.73 17.14 21.75
Inner West 56.42 40.86 16.22 22.64
Lower Nth Sydney 62.22 44.03 19.5 23.64
Central Nth Sydney 59.96 43.24 26.43 31.09
Northern Beaches 61.04 43.27 20.5 24.72
Central West Sydney 57.28 42.52 22.75 29.03
Canterbury-Bankstown 49.66 36.54 17.85 22.91
Blacktown 53.43 37.22 28.18 32.59
Fairfield-Liverpool 51.42 37.68 25.68 30.25
Outer South West 52.87 38.94 18.24 39.63
St George Sutherland 57.18 39.56 24.16 28.72
Outer West 56.65 39.23 32.86 37.82
SSD Drivers Total kms per day per all drivers Population Total Licence Holders
Inner Sydney 113,525 1,585,942 362,074 178,624
Eastern Suburbs 103,756 1,778,382 261,089 173,161
Inner West 79,607 1,291,231 195,230 127,167
Lower Nth Sydney 136,065 2,653,274 321,383 194,170
Central Nth Sydney 186,687 4,934,141 463,330 146,962
Northern Beaches 118,165 2,422,390 250,506 211,984
Central West Sydney 180,976 4,117,210 360,720 291,151
Canterbury-Bankstown 131,798 2,352,592 338,390 212,523
Blacktown 129,705 3,655,082 313,057 188,005
Fairfield-Liverpool 161,531 4,148,128 386,326 130,943
Outer South West 116,234 2,120,108 257,647 171,410
St George Sutherland 216,495 5,230,509 465,594 325,089
Outer West 161,735 5,314,614 330,454 104,697
All SSDs 1,836,280 41,603,603 4,305,800 2,455,886
Cost impacts to motorists of discounted registration fees in the presence of distance-based charges and 
implications for government revenue 
Hensher and Mulley 
 
7 
The decision support system calculates the status quo total costs and kilometres for all drivers and 
revenue to State Treasury, distinguishing outlays and receipts for the peak and off peak periods. We 
then introduce the range of peak-period DBCs and discounted registration fees and calculate the 
combination of these two cost outlays for motorists of each SSD that results in both a reduced mean 
cost outlay to motorists and no loss in revenue to State Treasury. At the SSD level, we expect to 
obtain different DBC levels for a given discount on the registration fee, and indeed that is what was 
obtained. The range is three to eight cents/km. as shown in Figure 2. Taking the lowest value would 
ensure net gains to each SSD motorist, but would result in the loss of neutrality (or better) to Treasury 
revenue. Placing different charges on motorists over the metropolitan area would raise clear concerns 
from many perspectives including the political ramifications. 
A preferred solution is to take a system wide approach (essentially a weighted averaging of the SSD 
data), and to identify a single DBC, given a discounted registration fee, that achieves the required 
financial outcomes for drivers and State Treasury. Table 2 summarise the findings in which the 
selected peak period DBC is 5c/km with a discounted registration fee of $185, slightly greater than a 
50 percent reduction.  On average, a driver saves $9 per annum and Treasury gains $32 per driver per 
annum. These are extremely low amounts per driver, but they translate into sizeable financial gains to 
all drivers (Figure 3) and State Treasury (Figure 4 and Table 3). Figure 3 highlight the total mean 
differences in cost outlays for drivers resident in each of the SSDs, with eight SSDs having positive 
gains and five SSD’s with negative gains. There is a total cost gain of $43.6m and a total cost loss of 
$28.8m. When converted to an additional cost outlay per driver per km the amount for the five 
affected SSDs is 0.34 cents/km, contrasted with 0.65 cents/km gain for the eight SSDs. 
In exploring the financial implications on drivers of moving away from an SSD-specific DBC 
solution, Table 4 is particularly informative in that it identifies the average gains or losses in cost 
outlays per driver per annum in each SSD. The blue shaded cells represent the preferred outcome 
when each SSD is assessed independently; and this is contrasted with the light beige shaded cells 
based on the system wide 5 cents/km solution. The light green shading for SSD’s 5 and 12 represents 
the situation where the SSD-specific and system wide DBC charge is the same. The evidence in Table 
4 suggests that, on average, car drivers are better off under the system wide DBC than under the SSD-
specific solution for SSDs 1-4, 6-8, and SSD 11, but Treasury is worse off; and worse off for SSDs 9 
and 10, with Treasury better off. The average annual financial gains and losses per driver at 5 
cents/km are relatively small, ranging from $91 for SSD1 to -$40 for SSD9. Of the SSDs located the 
furthest distance from the CBD (notably SSDs 9-13), drivers are better off under the 5 c/km DBC in 
SSD8 and SSD11, whereas in the other SSDs drivers are worse off, with annual cost outlay increases 
varying from a high of $84 (SSD13 - Outer West) to a low of  $3 (SSD12 – St George Sutherland). 
These are still, however, very small financial imposts on drivers. Importantly, however, as shown 
above, there appears to be no evidence of an income effect as a consequence of moving from SSD-
specific DBCs to a system wide DBC. 
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Figure 2:  A comparison of the system wide DBC versus SSD specific pricing 
 
Table 2:  Identifying a DBC and discounted registration fee that makes motorists  
and treasury financially no worse off 
 
 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
C/
Km
SSD
Comparison of Distance-based Charge Optimised for each 
SSD with Total System Optimal Charge
All SSDs DBC Peak c/km Specific SSD DBC Peak c/km
Car driver Treasury change in peak km
2 130 -113 -102
3 88 -64 -154
4 48 -16 -205
5 9 32 -256
6 -29 78 -307
7 -66 123 -358
8 -102 167 -409
9 -137 210 -461
10 -171 252 -512
ALL SSDs
Positive = gain, negative =  loss
Regn fees halved 
and DBC for peak 
kms only C/km
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Figure 3:  Impact of pricing reform on annual costs of driver per SSD 
 
Figure 4:  Impact of pricing reform on treasury revenue 
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Table 3:  Impact of pricing reform on treasury revenue per driver and for all drivers 
 
Table 4:  Summary of SSD-specific optimal DBC compared to the system wide 5c/km impact 
 
SSD
Treasury 
Impact 
Peak PA
Annual  Net 
Revenue Peak
Inner Sydney
-68 -7,690,883
Eastern Suburbs -31 -3,184,248
Inner West -36 -2,885,496
Lower Nth Sydney -3 -428,670
Centra l  Nth Sydney 80 15,002,723
Northern Beaches 3 412,293
Centra l  West Sydney 40 7,202,676
Canterbury-Bankstown -16 -2,157,321
Blacktown 93 12,001,333
Fairfield-Liverpool 65 10,432,742
Outer South West -16 -1,851,350
St George Sutherland 46 10,043,318
Outer West 145 23,453,308
Al l  SSD's 302 60,350,423
Pos =gain, neg= loss
 DBC for peak kms only Car driver Treasury change in peak km Car driver Treasury change in peak km Car driver Treasury change in peak km Car driver Treasury change in peak km
2 164 -154 -56 151 -139 -72 153 -141 -75 141 -128 -83
3 139 -125 -84 120 -102 -108 124 -106 -113 106 -85 -125
4 115 -96 -113 90 -66 -144 95 -71 -151 71 -43 -167
5 91 -68 -141 60 -30 -180 66 -36 -188 37 -3 -208
6 68 -40 -169 32 4 -215 39 -3 -226 4 37 -250
7 45 -13 -197 3 38 -251 12 30 -264 -28 77 -292
8 23 14 -225 -24 72 -287 -14 62 -301 -59 115 -333
9 2 40 -253 -50 104 -323 -39 93 -339 -90 152 -375
10 -19 66 -281 -76 136 -359 -64 123 -377 -119 189 -416
Pos =gain, neg= loss
 DBC for peak kms only
2 Car driver Treasury change in peak km Car driver Treasury change in peak km Car driver Treasury change in peak km
3 113 -93 -124 139 -125 -88 127 -110 -113
4 64 -34 -186 103 -82 -133 85 -60 -170
5 17 23 -248 67 -39 -177 45 -10 -227
6 -30 80 -311 32 3 -221 5 38 -283
7 -75 135 -373 -2 43 -265 -34 86 -340
8 -119 189 -435 -35 83 -310 -71 132 -397
9 -162 242 -497 -67 123 -354 -108 177 -453
10 -204 293 -559 -98 161 -398 -143 221 -510
 DBC for peak kms only Car driver Treasury change in peak km Car driver Treasury change in peak km Car driver Treasury change in peak km
2 147 -133 -86 109 -89 -125 118 -100 -118
3 114 -94 -128 58 -28 -188 72 -44 -177
4 82 -55 -171 8 32 -251 26 10 -236
5 51 -18 -214 -40 90 -313 -18 64 -295
6 21 19 -257 -88 148 -376 -61 116 -353
7 -9 55 -300 -134 204 -439 -103 167 -412
8 -37 91 -342 -179 259 -501 -143 217 -471
9 -65 125 -385 -222 312 -564 -183 265 -530
10 -92 158 -428 -264 365 -627 -221 313 -589
 DBC for peak kms only Car driver Treasury change in peak km Car driver Treasury change in peak km Car driver Treasury change in peak km
2 146 -133 -80 124 -107 -113 91 -67 -152
3 113 -94 -120 81 -55 -169 31 5 -228
4 81 -55 -161 38 -4 -225 -27 75 -304
5 49 -17 -201 -3 46 -281 -84 143 -380
6 19 21 -241 -43 95 -338 -139 211 -456
7 -11 57 -281 -82 143 -394 -193 276 -532
8 -41 93 -321 -120 189 -450 -245 340 -608
9 -69 128 -361 -157 235 -507 -296 403 -684
10 -96 162 -402 -193 279 -563 -345 464 -760
SSD1 SSD2 SSD3 SSD4
SSD5
InnSyd Eastern Suburbs Inner West Lower Nth Sydney
Central Nth Sydney Northern Beaches Central West Sydney
SSD6 SSD7
SSD8 SSD9 SSD10
Outer West
Canterbury-Bankstown Bankstown Fairfield-Liverpool
Outer South West St George Sutherland
SSD11 SSD12 SSD13
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Importantly the new reform package results in a 4.7 percent reduction in total annual peak period 
kilometres and a 2.96 percent reduction in all kilometres10
 a 4.77
 (given in Table 5 and Figure 5 for each 
SSD and overall for all SSDs). This percentage change of close to 5 percent in the peak is in line with 
evidence on what it takes to get a noticeable improvement in levels of traffic congestion, which are 
often associated with the reduced traffic during school holidays (see footnote 2 which reports  
percent drop in traffic volumes during school holidays in Sydney in 2005). Hence if the reform 
package of a combination of a peak period DBC of 5c/km is combined with a discounted registration 
fee of $185 on average, we can expect noticeable improvements in traffic congestion without cost hit 
to motorists or revenue loss to State Treasury. There will however be an overall 2.96 percent loss in 
fuel excise to the Federal government. 
Table 5:  Impact of pricing reform on annual kilometres 
 
 
 
Figure 5:  Impact of pricing reform on total driver kilometres per SSD 
  
                                                          
10 We recognise that this will likely be smaller when trips moving to off-peak periods are considered. 
 
SSD
Total Daily 
Peak Kms 
Before
Total Daily Peak 
Kms - Peak DBC, 
50%Rego
Total Daily 
Off peak Kms 
Before
Total aily 
OffPk Kms - 
Peak DBC, 
50%Rego
Total Daily 
Kms Before
Tot Daily Kms - 
Peak DBC, 
50%Rego
Inner Sydney 960,137 915,997 625,805 625,805 1,585,942 1,541,802
Eastern Suburbs 1,100,758 1,047,854 677,624 677,624 1,778,382 1,725,478
Inner West 819,932 779,731 471,299 471,299 1,291,231 1,251,030
Lower Nth Sydney 1,661,215 1,579,473 992,059 992,059 2,653,274 2,571,532
Centra l  Nth Sydney 3,175,539 3,021,395 1,758,602 1,758,602 4,934,141 4,779,997
Northern Beaches 1,480,543 1,414,676 941,847 941,847 2,422,390 2,356,523
Centra l  West Sydney 2,653,106 2,526,716 1,464,105 1,464,105 4,117,210 3,990,821
Canterbury-Bankstown 1,502,772 1,434,478 849,820 849,820 2,352,592 2,284,298
Blacktown 2,282,529 2,185,637 1,372,553 1,372,553 3,655,082 3,558,189
Fairfield-Liverpool 2,596,794 2,474,630 1,551,333 1,551,333 4,148,128 4,025,964
Outer South West 1,327,221 1,267,888 792,886 792,886 2,120,108 2,060,774
St George Sutherland 3,263,618 3,100,803 1,966,891 1,966,891 5,230,509 5,067,694
Outer West 3,345,305 3,190,485 1,969,309 1,969,309 5,314,614 5,159,794
Al l  SSD's 26,169,470 24,939,764 15,434,133 15,434,133 41,603,603 40,373,897
Percent Change -4.70% -2.96%
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5c/km and $185 Annual Registration Fee
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The analysis reported so far has been based on the average driver in each SSD. To investigate the 
likely implications on cost outlays and revenue raised of deviations around the mean, we have taken 
the two extremes of all drivers in each SSD having high and low kilometres. The relevant levels for 
each SSD are given in Table 6 and range from a high of 75 kilometres per driver per day to a low of 8 
kilometres per driver per day, both in the Outer West. Under these kilometre assumptions, we find 
that the peak period DBC is reduced to 2c/km for the high kilometres and increased to 10c/km for the 
low kilometres, given the same discounted registration fee of $185. If all drivers were at the high or 
low kilometre level, State Treasury is financially much better off than under the 5c/km DBC, due to 
either the greater number of kilometres in the peak periods, or the higher DBC. Drivers however are 
worse off if they all operated at the high kilometres, while substantially better off at the low 
kilometres. Clearly this evidence is not what will occur in reality because of a distribution of annual 
kilometres across all drivers. Even with a user loss of $14.076m, that is equivalent to only 2.01 cents 
per day per driver, hardly noticeable! 
Table 6:  Implications of high and low annual kilometres in each SSD 
Peak period DBC =2c/km for high kms and 10c/km for low kms 
annual registration fee is held at the discounted fee of $185 
Positive = savings 
SSD Annual Kilometres 
per driver per day 
 
Change in Driver Costs 
$ per annum per SSD 
Change in Treasury Revenue 
$ per annum per SSD 
 Low High Low Kms High Kms Low Kms High Kms 
Inner Sydney 10 40 5,296,833 7,775,340 -1,500,051 -4,737,915 
Eastern Suburbs 12 45 1,000,505 4,901,139 3,352,227 -1,636,590 
Inner West 12 45 642,193 3,497,667 2,872,721 -861,481 
Lower Nth Sydney 15 65 -5,896,785 -4,007,725 13,197,394 10,334,920 
Central Nth Sydney 12 65 685,461 -6,488,833 7,781,749 15,661,644 
Northern Beaches 10 55 5,420,140 1,430,670 -1,392,256 3,000,003 
Central West Sydney 10 55 7,455,849 649,823 -598,481 6,893,282 
Canterbury-Bankstown 10 50 5,518,786 3,174,935 -611,578 1,732,272 
Blacktown 15 70 -5,537,584 -6,185,996 12,460,972 12,647,825 
Fairfield-Liverpool 12 65 1,488,862 -4,737,450 5,442,874 12,246,831 
Outer South West 9 50 6,902,847 3,137,157 -3,161,920 1,019,429 
St George Sutherland 12 65 2,375,002 -6,199,179 6,854,364 16,197,659 
Outer West 8 75 12,161,459 -11,024,484 -7,483,515 19,795,630 
All SSDs 10 55 37,513,570 -14,076,936 37,214,501 92,293,510 
 
Another way of considering variations in total peak and off peak kilometres is to stay with the DBC of 
5c/km and to calculate the impost on drivers with high and low kilometres (Table 7). Although State 
Treasury is significantly better off under both low and high kilometres, drivers are much better off 
under low kilometres, but substantially worse off under high kilometres, as might be expected. It is 
clear that if say, 20 percent of all drivers have peak kilometres much greater than the weighted 
average for all SSDs, then some adjustment down in DBC will be required or a further discount of the 
registration fee. The ‘optimal’ DBC of 5c/km is the lowest we can obtain if State Treasury is to be no 
worse off (see Table 2); however if we reduce the registration fee we may be able to establish a 
possible ‘solution’. A zero registration fee does not work at all for Treasury; a $150 registration fee 
will satisfy the Treasury budget constraint at 5c/km (gaining $11 instead of $32 per driver per annum) 
while making drivers better off (gaining $32 compared to $9 per annum), but only at a very slightly 
higher kilometres than the average kilometres. 
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Table 7:  Implications of high and low annual kilometres in each SSD 
Peak period DBC =5c/km for high and low kms 
Annual registration fee is held at the discounted fee of $185 
Positive = savings 
SSD Annual Kilometres 
per driver per day 
 
Change in Driver Costs 
$ per annum per SSD 
Change in Treasury Revenue 
$ per annum per SSD 
 Low High Low Kms High Kms Low Kms High Kms 
Inner Sydney 10 40 14,307,805 -15,677,906 -12,409,414 23,271,470 
Eastern Suburbs 12 45 11,036,737 -19,611,823 -8,860,372 27,773,194 
Inner West 12 45 8,340,664 -15,609,974 -6,583,207 22,200,438 
Lower Nth Sydney 15 65 10,631,043 -50,773,151 -6,980,738 66,591,138 
Central Nth Sydney 12 65 19,235,148 -71,886,155 -15,001,543 94,818,182 
Northern Beaches 10 55 14,825,949 -32,313,832 -12,812,007 43,390,513 
Central West Sydney 10 55 22,119,151 -52,916,193 -18,690,467 71,773,956 
Canterbury-Bankstown 10 50 16,176,667 -32,091,947 -13,723,064 44,359,965 
Blacktown 15 70 10,174,725 -54,085,857 -6,713,031 70,240,430 
Fairfield-Liverpool 12 65 17,079,316 -60,165,202 -13,613,448 78,938,656 
Outer South West 9 50 15,427,902 -27,582,892 -13,557,438 37,974,358 
St George Sutherland 12 65 23,019,199 -80,243,178 -18,404,516 105,239,380 
Outer West 8 75 22,857,881 -75,335,331 -20,518,909 97,263,195 
All SSDs 10 55 205,232,187 -588,293,441 -167,868,152 783,834,875 
 
What is emerging from this analysis is that if we can increase the net revenue to Treasury 
substantially, while not making users worse off on average, then we can use the net Treasury gains to 
compensate drivers who have kilometres in excess of the average, possibly limiting this to 25 percent 
or more above the average. As the annual savings are very small per driver for users and Treasury 
(shown in Table 3), an increase in cost, say of $100 per year, amounts to a minimal amount per trip. 
For example, in Table 2, if we had a peak DBC of 10c/km, the average cost increase per driver per 
day would be 46 cents on average or 2 cents per kilometre over all kilometres. The resulting increase 
in net revenue to State Treasury can then be available to compensate high peak kilometre drivers11
Conclusions 
, 
and based on the evidence in Tables 2 and 3 this could amount to over $60m per annum available for 
disbursement. A user loss of $588.29m is equivalent to 89 cents per day per driver (or $324 per 
annum), or 3.8 cents per kilometre, which again is very small! We might suggest, given these very 
small numbers, that a case can be made for a higher DBC above 5c/km as a way of ensuring sufficient 
additional funds to compensate high peak kilometre drivers. 
The road pricing reform proposal developed in this paper is designed to provide a pathway to gaining 
buy in from the community that is essential to securing the support of the political process. With 
demonstrated evidence in the initial phase of reform that the majority of drivers and the State 
government will not be worse off financially, it is easier to obtain buy in, regardless of the 
implications for reduced traffic congestion and faster trips. The real bonus and effective selling point 
will occur when drivers see real time savings and motoring associations finally are convinced that 
their members do gain from such pricing reform. We see no reason to suggest that the results for 
Sydney do not translate to other cities and countries. 
This is the first study that we are aware of that has systematically investigated a reform package that 
can appeal to key stakeholders and that places quantitative evidence on the table for an entire 
Metropolitan area. The great majority of well articulated academic and consultancy research has 
failed in this endeavour. Indeed a recent comment by Poole (2012) best summarises this position: 
                                                          
11 This will need very careful consideration. It should be fair as well. If high peak km drivers get a lot of compensation, they pay much less 
per km than people that drive below average kms. So this would more or less mean that the first kms are charged at a higher rate, while 
the rate diminishes. Does this have the desired effect? In the end, high peak km drivers may have less and less incentive to decrease 
their kilometres driven. 
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“I’m struck by what seems to be a huge disconnect between the systems being modeled by academic 
economists and the proposals emerging from field tests and demonstrations involving actual 
motorists.” (Poole 2012). 
This road pricing reform plan would require drivers to purchase an on-board unit (OBU) 
(approximately $50 once off cost12
In ongoing research using the same data and analysis framework, Mulley and Hensher (2012) 
investigate the vertical equity implications of the road pricing reform scheme proposed in the current 
paper. Vertical equity requires that revenues benefit low-income drivers as a class at least as much as 
the costs they bear, and that disadvantaged residents (including non-drivers) benefit overall. A popular 
view is that revenues must be dedicated to transport improvements to be politically feasible, but some 
analyses indicate that alternative distributions that include broad tax reductions or financial rebates 
benefit the largest number of citizens and therefore may be more politically popular (Littman 1996, 
Hensher and Li 2012). 
) that will record the kilometres by time of day. The off peak 
kilometres are not charged, but peak kilometres will be charged at the agreed cents/km. This scenario 
implies that if an OBU is not installed, all kilometres will be charged as peak kilometres, giving an 
incentive to install a meter (with the expectation that all motorists will do so), just like households 
have had with off peak electricity meters or with water meters when they were first introduced. 
In the current paper we have focussed on a peak DBC; however we have also considered the 
possibility of an all day DBC, which will be lower than the 5c/km peak charge, optimised at 3c/km. 
There are arguments for and against peak versus all day charging. For example, charging only in the 
peak may make some people worse off, especially those that cannot avoid the peak period because of 
fixed working hours in comparison to others that have flexible working hours, although the higher 
DBC in the peak with a no off peak charge may result in them being no worse off given the 
percentage of all kilometres that are in the peak. Clearly this effect may be increased, subject to the 
relativity of a peak only and an all day DBC, because all revenues need to come from peak hours, 
such that the peak rate needs to be higher, but for Sydney the difference is only 2c/km. As part of the 
paper on vertical equity (Mulley and Hensher 2012) we are exploring the possibility that, although on 
average, drivers are no worse off financially under a peak DBC, a peak rate only scheme might lead to 
large differences, where many will be much worse off, and many will be much better off. Having an 
off-peak rate might spread the financial impact much more, and hence does not create such huge 
equity issues. 
Finally, this paper has focussed on motorists resident in Sydney and is designed to move to a more 
efficient use of roads by using the price signal to underpin motorist’s travel behaviour. However, there 
is a good case to extend the reform package to all vehicles, freight and passenger, as well as all 
jurisdictions under the control of a single government (in our case it would be New South Wales). In 
doing this, vehicles would be more closely paying for the damage done to roads.  However, a charge 
related to damage is likely to be a lower all day DBC than is suggested by this paper and would be 
similarly replacing an element of registration charge when implementing the scheme outside of capital 
cities where traffic congestion is not an issue. When initial reform is bedded down and accepted, a 
case for increasing the DBC may be considered, as a way of raising much need funding for future 
investment in public transport and roads as a consequence of the diminishing revenue base from 
traditional and more inefficient sources. 
 
  
                                                          
12 Based on the expected volume of installations. 
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